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In his essay collection The Curtain, Kundera defends 
Flaubert’s fictional work against the expansion-
ist aims of the archivist: “the work, l’oeuvre, is not 
simply everything a novelist writes—notebooks, 
diaries, articles. It is the end result of long labor on 
an aesthetic project” (96). Kundera’s censure would 
seem to compound the bad faith of a Kafka schol-
arship which continues to discover and to organise 
his unauthorised oeuvre, and by extension the bad 
faith of Kafka criticism which takes this oeuvre, 
and much else, as the proper context for recovering 
the meaning of his stories and novels. If Kundera 
is right, should we isolate Kafka’s fiction from the 
expanding work of the archivists? And should we, 
perhaps invoking the modernist credo l’art pour l’art, 
protect it as a pure aesthetic object from all extra-
aesthetic reality which doesn’t find an explicit home 
in the work itself? In the brief discussion below I 
accept Kundera’s modernist censure as a constrain-
ing heuristic and suggest a conceptual distinction 
which nonetheless will allow us in good conscience 
to expand the significance of Kafka’s fiction.
The distinction: Non-fictional works—essays, 
notes, letters, documents of various kinds—contain 
many truth claims, declarative sentences which are 
either true or false; they have, as philosophers say, a 
propositional content. Fictional works on the other 
hand make no truth claims; they contain no state-
ments which are literally true, no propositions. This 
distinction, innocuously, upholds the well-known 
distinction between showing and telling, between 
using language indirectly to suggest something to 
the reader (metaphor is a paradigm of this use of 
language) and using language explicitly to say some-
thing (statements are the paradigm here). But the 
no-truth-in-fiction distinction is far more radical, 
and far from obvious. Consider the objection that 
virtually every fictional work ever written positively 
brims with declarative sentences, sentences which 
seem explicitly to say something, to make claims 
about reality which are either true or false. 
This apparently compelling objection trades on 
a subtle equivocation, namely that sentences per 
se are the bearers of meaning, as opposed to the 
entire structure of a language, and the relationship 
of that language to reality. The objection thus sim-
ply assumes the view generally rejected by philoso-
phers of language and linguists that sentences in 
isolation from a language convey meaning. Without 
this equivocation, or undefended assumption, it is 
difficult to imagine how any reformulation of the 
objection could succeed, even this refined version 
of the objection: that many sentences in fictional 
works are indistinguishable from (look the same as) 
sentences which can be uttered outside the work of 
fiction. It is straightforwardly true that many sen-
tences in a fictional work could be extracted and, 
without changing their linguistic appearance, recast 
as statements, non-mimetic, literal claims about real-
ity; yet it doesn’t follow that within the context of 
the fictional work the same sentences literally say, 
i.e. explicitly state, anything about the non-fictional 
world outside the text, about reality. Indeed were 
they to do so, as readers we would no longer find 
ourselves reading a purely fictional work. 
Perhaps that’s not a problem if we decide to reject 
the purist art-for-art credo, and not let it extend into 
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ture machine would remain fixed inside the work. A 
practical problem occurs with this arrangement. Even 
if it could coherently be made, it would substitute a 
rather trite relationship between fictional and non-
fictional facts for the incommensurate and open-ended 
mimetic relationship which exists between fictional 
language and the real world, a relationship not of fac-
tual correspondence but of suggestive parallels which 
operate outside the constraints of logic, truth, and 
conventional linguistic meaning.
The benefits of a language which operates outside 
these constraints: In a real-world/natural language, 
statements are fixed, so that a sentence expressing 
a statement has a univocal meaning and expresses 
a single truth. Were the fictional language in Kaf-
ka’s penal colony story to operate under a similar 
regime, all narrative talk describing the torture 
machine would roughly be confined to a descrip-
tion of a mechanical device which once upon a time 
performed a rather pointless task and now no longer 
adequately works. Even if the description were fleshed 
out, we would be left with an imperceptive, unimagi-
native, perfectly literal reading, the kind of reading 
that the officer might offer were he to materialise 
as Kafka’s most unflinchingly literal reader. Under 
a more flexible regime, which sees fictional lan-
guage as inherently indeterminate and (therefore) 
non-propositional, the seemingly literal narrative 
description can be maintained; it doesn’t become 
literally false the way we’re sometimes told every 
metaphor does once we fasten onto its real mean-
ing. For there is no question of truth and therefore 
no question of the narrative description being false; 
nor of it embodying a special meaning which it con-
veys to us and which can be formulated as the truth 
that the fiction is really expressing. Instead we have 
as many interpretations, ascriptions of non-literal 
meaning, as the particular words and sentences of 
the story can productively yield. 
The Insurance Man installation tacitly observes 
the no-truth-in-fiction distinction, by playfully turn-
semantic theory. There is a trivial sense in which fic-
tional and non-fictional contexts do overlap, a sense 
in which they allow us to use language interchange-
ably between these contexts. One of the points of the 
no-truth-in-fiction distinction, however, is to become 
clear about the linguistic role, the mimetic role, of 
any utterance or piece of language in a story or novel 
and to distinguish this use of language from the way 
a similar utterance works when used to state facts 
about the world. A reader might of course still talk 
about narrative facts as though they have a life out-
side a novel or story. She might, for example, wonder 
whether anyone in early 20th-century Prague wore a 
nightshirt (The Trial), or whether there ever existed 
a penal colony which centred its judicial process on 
an ingenious sentence-inscribing torture machine 
(In the Penal Colony). But these hypothetical claims, 
whether true or false, function outside the fictional 
work, in a language which is capable of expressing 
propositions, statements which are literally either 
true or false about reality. Fictional language by con-
trast has a radically different function, one which we 
should hesitate to weaken, even if the temptation to 
do so were coherent.
The temptation to see language working mimeti-
cally within a work of fiction as somehow proposi-
tional, as simultaneously expressing truths outside 
the work, standing as it were with one leg placed in 
the real world, entails insoluble problems for our very 
understanding of the connection between truth and 
language. A problem nearer to literary critical con-
cerns is that we would undermine the rich economy 
of meaning of the fictional work, and as it were create 
a colony within the work to which all mimetic truths 
that don’t correspond to real-world (non-narrative) 
facts would be consigned. For example, nightshirts, 
which after all were once common enough in the real 
world, would enjoy a special dispensation that would 
allow them the freedom to move in and out of the work, 
or to figure in claims that refer simultaneously within 
and outside the work, whereas a purely imaginal tor-
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ing a diverse assortment of archival and other materi-
als into an open-ended aesthetic response to Kafka’s 
penal colony story, and thus avoids simply collapsing 
the wall between art and reality. In this way, the instal-
lation suggests a tension in the issue that Kundera 
raises concerning the autonomy of aesthetic works. It 
resists treating the story and these materials as a com-
mon work—as Kundera would have it “an enormous 
common grave” in which the novelist is buried under 
the weight of the totalising archival oeuvre—even 
while displaying the materials as part of the potential 
context of the story, as informing prospective interpre-
tations of the story. In his curatorial statement, Jerry 
Zaslove hints at this tension when he describes the 
installation as bringing ordinary objects and interests 
from Kafka’s life into contact with the story, through 
“a mise en scene [which] allows us to see the execution 
as an everyday affair” (4-5). Were we to take Kundera’s 
comment as a prescription to wean ourselves from 
all such contact, we would absorb something of the 
reductive spirit of the aforesaid hypothetical officer’s 
literal, non-mimetic reading. Not only would we cor-
don this text and others off from the prosaic actuality 
of Kafka’s own interests, but, more importantly from 
the standpoint of the modernist aesthetics which Kun-
dera supports, from the artistic virtuosity with which 
his stories and novels transform these interests into 
an aesthetic product, modestly in the case of a night-
shirt turned into a minor variation of the larger joke 
through which the narrative of The Trial unfolds, and 
with spellbinding dexterity and scope in the case of 
the central mimetic device of the penal colony story, 
a literally unimaginable execution machine which 
artfully recovers discourses, materials, and events, 
which literally remain outside the story.
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